Introduction
This article is about a vital aspect of psychotherapeutic practice-disclosing personal infonnation. This is the clients' obligation and the bedrock of psychotherapy. Professional psychotherapeutic literature, however, recognizes that therapists also disclose personal infonnation about themselves to their clients . Research on self-<iisclosure in social psychology, based on work of Sidney Jourard, suggests that in everyday conversations disclosures of personal infonnation tend to be reciprocated (e.g., . This finding, however, like most in social psychology, has acquired many qualifications over time and in any case cannot apply to systematically asymmetric interactions such as psychotherapy . Is revealing personal infonnation by therapists a usefuJ practice? Professional views on this vary. Freud's argument was that 'the doctor should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him' . Why?-partly because disclosures present the psychoanalyst as a unique person in her own right and so interfere with 'transference', which involves the therapist symbolizing a significant 'other' to the client and is the psychoanalyst's important tool. Client-centered psychotherapists, working in Rogerian tradition, likewise avoid self-disclosures, but for a very different reason-they consider them therapeutically worthless since they turn attention in the session from the client. Other psychotherapies, however, consider therapist seLf-disclosure to be a useful practice, and even in psychoanalytic psychotherapy Freud's dictwn lost some of its force (see, e.g., . Cognitive beha.vior therapists' policy is to use self-disclosure to normalize some problems (Le., they are problems of living not requiring psychotherapy) or, alternatively, to model to the client how to deal with problems (e.g., Morrison et al. 2003 and personal communication) .
Feminist therapies (e.g., Raja 1998) and at least
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Therapist self-disclosure then is a dilemma for psychotherapy in general. It is discussed largely in terms of therapeutic principles at stake; for instance, between openness on the one hand and professionalism on the other (see, for example, ). The value attributed to self-disclosure depends on the school of therapy (compare, e.g., the articles in the special issue of the Journal of Clinical Psychology, .
Whether self-disclosure is used or shunned, the common implicit theme seems to be that therapist selfdisclosure may affect the therapeutic relationship on which the effects of psychotherapy depend. Selfdisclosure may also have specific effects such as providing didactic examples and models. These professional insights provide an ethnographic background essential in understanding psychotherapeutic practices but they do not reveal how psychotherapists actually do self-disclosure. It could be that therapists do this in any odd way, or maybe they follow relatively cohesive set of formats. As far as we know, there has not been one systematic inspection of therapists' self-disclosures as they happen in therapeutic talk. Conversation analysis (CA) can make evident practices of which therapists are not explicitly aware-they do not specify disclosure at the level of talk . Sometimes CA can correct professional accounts that do not correspond with what actually happens in talk, as Per~il(yla and Vehvilainen (2003) pointed out.
(See also the burgeoning CA literature on interviews and orally administered assessments, e.g., Houtkoop-Steenstra 2000; Antaki 1999.) CA's main task is describing how people act through using the structures of conversational practices. Psychotherapy is talk but it is not just talktherapeutic policies supervene on talk. Clients' and thempists' engagements are resourced by therapeutic policies, which are relatively specific to different schools of therapy and are inscribed in the practice of therapy through training, yet allowing therapists a room for maneuver. Such policies are both 'recognizable' in how the therapy is done and consequential for the talk. The problem for CA studies of psychotherapy is to show how therapists' orientation to such policies is introduced into the talk and becomes consequential, thus explaining how talk becomes a (specific kind of) therapeutic practice. One way this is accomplished is through formulating the therapeutic settings and the participants (Leudar et a1. 2005;  er. Schegloff 1972 Schegloff , 1991 . With respect to disclosure, this means that therapists may use it to manage locally their identity as well as psychotherapeutic settings.
There are, then, ample reasons to explore how selfdisclosures are actually done in talk in psychotherapy . We shall ourselves take no position on whether such disclosures are a good or bad thing. Rather, our aim is to bring to focus their interactional features and visible consequences. This wiU add to ethnomethodological and conversation analyses' growing understanding of psychotherapeutic practices (for examples, see Turner 1972; Hutchby 2002; Madill et a1. 2001; Periikyla 2004; VehviHiinen 2003a VehviHiinen , 2003b Antaki et a\. , 2005a Antaki et a\. , 2005b . It will, we hope, also add to the understanding of institutional practices more generally, where service providers collaborate with clients to bring off the business they have in hand.
Data
We examined over twelve hours of recorded one-toone psychotherapy sessions, involving four therapists (all female) and seven clients (two males, five females) . These recordings comprised -six cognitive behavior psychotherapy sessions offered on the British National Health system to clients with schizophrenia (three sessions by one therapist, and three sessions by another); -three sessions of psychotherapy carried out by a humanistically oriented therapist in private practice; -six sessions by a client-centered psychotherapist working in the Rogerian framework, providing brief therapy to clients with problems at work.
Three of these are with one client, three with another.
All told, these 15 therapy sessions yielded 23 cases of therapist self-disclosure, I t of which are used in detail in this article. The sources we Looked into hardly hope to capture the range of psychotherapeutic practice and are a very partial sampling of therapy. We do not mean our findings to be taken as representative or exhaustive-the study is a first step. How did we identify therapist self-disclosures? In everyday dlscourse, disclosure refers to making public something which one would have expected to keep private. The identincation of self-disclosures in therapy talk is not always easy-in a sense, anything that therapists do 'says' something about thern. What matters is what counts as a self-discJosure for tberapists, and here we were guided by how the research literature defines therapist 'self-disclosure ' (e .g., lourard and Lasakow 1958) . This came down to a commonsense member's intuition, which we characterize roughJy as 'the voluntary provision of personal information qualitatively different from the kind of technical or professional personal information relevant to the interaction '. Of course, this kind of definition glosses a number of considerations about selfdisclosure as a member's concern, but we leave such a discussion to another pLace ). Here we only need a robust idea of what to look for, 28 lvan Leudar, Charles Amaki, and Rebecca Barnes some lesbian therapies (e.g., Pearlrnan I ~96) encourage self-disclosure. arguing that it works to even up interactive asynunetries.
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Dahl
We examined over twelve hours of recorded one~to one psychotherapy sessions, involving four therapists (all female) and seven clients (two males, five females) . These rewrdings comprised -six cognitive behavior psychotherapy sessions offered on the British NationaJ Health system to cljeots with schizophrenia (thr~ sessions by one therap1st, and three sessions by another); -three sessions of ps)'chotherapy carried out by a humarustically oriented therapist in private practice; -six sessions by a client-cenlered psychotherapist working in the Rogerian framework, providing brief therapy to clients with problems at work. Three of these are with one client, three with another.
All told, these 15 lherapy sessions yielded 23 cases of therapist seIf,disclosure, I t of wruch are used in detail in this article . The sources we looked into hardly hope to capture the range of psychotherapeutic prac--tiee and are a ve.ry partial sampling of therapy. We do Dot mean our .findings to be taken as representative or exhaustive-the study is a first step. How did we identify therapist self-disclosures? In everyday ruscourse, djscJosure refers to making pubhc something which one would have expected to keep private_ The identification of self-disclosures in therapy talk is not always easy-in a sense, anything that therapists do I says' something about them . What matters is what counts as a self-disclosure for therapists, and here we were guided by how the research literature defines therapist 'self-dlsc1osure ' (e.g., lourard and Lasakow 1958) . Ths came down t.o a commonsense member's intuition, which we characterize roughJy as 'the voluntary provision of personal lnfonnation qualitatively different from the kind of technical or professional personal tnfonnation relevant to the interaction'. Of course, this kind of definition glosses a number of considerations about selfdisclosure as a member's concern, but we leave such a discussion to another place We start with some very general findings. First, as we expected, psychotherapists use self-disclosure sparingly. In fact, our client-centered therapist did not do so once in six sessions. Second, as we shall see, even these uncommon self-disclosures tend to be of ordinary matters-not obviously things one needs to keep secret. The final general finding is a negative one-almost none of the therapists' disclosures in our sample are designed as answers to clients' enquiries, J nor as part of a round of independent, noorecipient-designed personal confessionals. In other words, they seemed largely not to be designed to come across as standalone, ' textbook' disclosures (say, unilateral disclosures of the therapist's own sexuality). On the coutrary, we found therapists' selfdisclosures in the therapy sessions to occur overwhelmingly io positions where they come across explicitly as some kind of commentary on something that the client has just said (if we may gloss it so crudely for the moment) and in particular a commentary on a problem a client revealed. In effect, disclosure is hearably relevant to what the patient says. The particular signal that the therapist's disclosure is set off by the client is that it is designed as some kind of topical match of what the client has just said, or of some aspect of it. There is some content in the therapist's turn that stakes a claim to be an echo, a 'me too', a 'second story', and so on, which has some family resemblance to something in the client's preceding turn or turns. Here are some examples (see the Appendix for the transcription conventions). In each case we have followed the extract with a presentation of the topical match as a distilled pair of turns (with the most obvious nucleus of the matches highlighted in bold), and without doing aoy further analysis for the moment: We start with some very general findings. First, as we expected, psychotherapists use self-disclosure sparingly. In fact, our client-centered therapist did not do so once in six sessions. Second, as we shaH see, even these uncommon self-disclosures tend to be of ordinary matters-not obviously things one needs to keep secret. The .final general finding is a negative one-almost none of the therapists' disclosures in our sample are designed as answers 10 cJjeots' enquiries,) nor as part of a round of independent, noorecipient-designed personal confessionals. In other words, they seemed largely not to be designed to come across as standalone, 'textbook' disclosures (say, unilateral disclosures of the therapist's own sexuality). On the coo.trary, we found therapists' selfdisclosures in the therapy sessions to occur overwhelmingly io positions where they come across explicitly as some kind of commentary on something that the client has just said (if we may gloss it so crudely for the moment) and in particular a commentary on a problem a client revealed. In effect, disclosw-e is hearably relevant to what the patient says. The particular signal that the therapist's disclosure is set off by the client is that it is designed as some kind of topical match of what the client has just said, or of some aspect of it. There is some content in the therapist's turn that stakes a claim 10 be an echo, a 'me too', a 'second story', and so on, which has some family resemblance to something in the client's preceding turn or turns. Here are some examples (see the Appendix for the transcription conventions). In each case we have followed the extract with a presentition of the (opical match as a distilled pair of turns (with the most obvious nucleus of the matches highhghted in bold), and without doing any further analysis for the moment: In these examples the therapist is disclosing relatively ordinary experieoces. 2 It is oot, however, that therapists are doing sometrung 'merely conversational' in matching trivial experiences (though that too wouJd be of interest, of course). What we can observe here is that this sort of matching visible in the extracts above (and especially in their distilled fonn, as we have stripped them down) preserves some aspect of the prior by a number of means including lexical, for example pre-and/or post-framing, and grammatical, for example use of pro-term references. However, they also operate on the prior turn in a oumber of ways; for example, by upgrading a prior referent or by replacing words, and by changing the point of focalization (Genette 1980: 189-194) , which change the interactional thrust of the prior. The clients' talk 00 'A events' (Labov and Fanshel 1977) , or their experiential informings, therefore become implementing actions for the therapists' 'A events'. This actionorientation calls to nUnd Heritage and Lindstr6m's (1998) Heritage and Lindstrom's interests in that paper were in bow the 'moral problem' of a mother disclosing that she does not feel much love for her child is introduced, depicted, and resolved, so their interest in the disclosure as such is comparatively tangential. But there is enough institutional similarity between the health visitor/troubled-mother pair and that of the therapist and client for us to use this reading of their work as a very helpful point of departure: the health visitor's subsequent disclosure (and, by extension here, the therapist's) matches something in the client's, and by doing so achieves some institutional objective (in their case, deal with the moral sensitivity of the mother's lack of affection for her baby; in ours, a set of therapy-related issues we shall see below).
Note, of course, that when we say 'matching' (and, implicitly, when Heritage and Lindstrom do so), we are referring to the form of the therapist's turn-the achieved similarity, especially as it relates to the experiences of both parties-oat to what it does. We use the term 'matching' in preference to something still more theory-laden like 'echoing' or 'reciprocating',3 as we want to avoid anything that might prevent us from seeing, open-rnindedly, just what it is that the self-disclosure is doing. We shall see examples of this below, but the thing to emphasize at this point is that the disclosures were visibly designed to be the opposite of 'stand-alone'; they were to be understood to do their work precisely in virtue of their juxtaposition with what the client was doing at the time.
What we shall do in tbe bulk of this article is, first, . to offer an account of three different sequential environments for therapists' disclosures, and to say what they accomplish. We shall then look more closely at their internal design.
Three sequential environments for therapists' disclosures
In this first section, we will anaJyze three positionsensitive actions by which therapists match clients' experience: an agreement (or same evaluation; Pomerantz 1984a), a second story : see especially vol. 2, 222-268 on story-telling and story recipiency), and a candidate answer for one that is accountably absent (Pomerantz 1988) . In each case we wiJI try to bring out how by claiming and proving similarity of experience, the disclosure can do ioteractional work. Later, 1n the second part of the analysis section, we pick out two design features of disclosures for comment: their recipient design and their use of extreme case formulations (Pomerantz 1986 ). Leudar, Charles (Genette 1980: 189-194) , which change the interactional thrust of the prior. The clients' talk on 'A evenLS' (Labov and Fanshel 1977) , or their experiential infonnings, therefore become implementing actions for the therapists' 'A events'. This actionorientation calls to rrUnd Heritage and Lindstr6m's (1998) work OD the interactions between health visitors and mothers. Heritage and Lindstrom found that mothers were very unJikely to disclose things about themselves (for reasons we need not go into here) but did find one deviant case where a mother did disclose; and in that case, the health visitor herself disclosed too. Heritage and Lindstrom call this an example of 'experiential matching', a term which resonates with what we see in our sample of therapists' disclosures.
/van
Here is an example from their data:
(4) Heritage and Liodstrom (1998: 417) : (14) Heritage and Lindstrom's interests in that paper were in how the 'moral problem' of a mother disclosing that she does not feel much love for ber child is introduced, depicted, and resolved, so their interest in the disclosure as such is comparatively tangential. But there is enough institutional similarity between the health visitor/troubled-mother pair and that of the therapist and client for us to use this reading of their work as a very helpful point of departure: the health visitor's subsequent disclosure (and, by extension here, the therapist's) matches something in the client's, and by doing so achieves some institutional objective (in thcir case, deal with the moral sensitivity of the mother's lack of affection for her baby; in ours, a set of therapy-related issues we shall see below).
Note, of course, that when we say 'matching' (and, implicitly, when Heritage and Lindstrom do so), we are referring to the form of tbe therapist's turn-the achieved similarity, especially as it relates to the experiences of both parties-not to what it does. We use the term 'matching' in preference to something still more theory-laden like 'echoing' or 'reciprocating? as we want to avoid anything that might prevent us from seeing, open-mindedly, just what it is that the self-disclosure is doing. We shall see examples of this below, but the trung to emphasize at this point is that the disclosures were visibly designed to be the opposite of 'stand-alone'; they were to be understood to do their work precisely in virtue of their juxtaposition with what the client was doing at the time.
What wc shall do in tbe bulk of this article is, first, to offer an account of tbree different sequential eovironments for therapists' d~sclosures, and to say what they accomplish. We shall then look more closely at their internal design.
3.1.

Three sequential environments for therapists' disclosures
In this first section, we will analyze th('ee positionsensitive actions by which therapists match clients' experience: an agreement (or same evaluation; Pomerantz 1984a), a second story : see especially vol. 2, 222-268 on story-telling and story recipiency), and a candidate answer for one that is accountably absent (Pomerantz 1988) . In each case we will try to bring out how by claiming and proving similarity of experience, the disclosure can do interactional work. Later, in the second part of the analysis section, we pick out two design fealures of disclosures for comment: their recipient design and their use of extreme case formulations (Pomerantz 1986 ).
Matching with agreements
We shall see later that disclosures can be designed to match a client's prior turn with quite complexJy organized experiences of the therapist's own. But we shall start with what seems at first sight the simpler case, where the therapist responds with a (comparatively) 'straightforward' experiential match. Here the disclosure is occasioned by the client's ex.pressed position on, or evaluation of, some topic, making relevant the therapist's response or second assessment. In our sample, if the therapist offered a disclosure on such an occasion, it was in the format of an agreement, often as a 'same evaluation' as in oh so would I (Ex-
Let us consider that example in detail. On the face of it., we could gloss it thus: the therapist tells tbe client he can see her notes, he responds that he'd like to, and she discloses that she herself would love to see her own notes. But that gloss hides two significant things: just what the c]jent is doing in his turn, and exactly what the therapist says in her disclosure, and bow it bears on the implications of what the client had just said. We need go through the extract carefully, taking it as an illustration of the kind of work that such an apparently simple affiliative disclosure does. Let us work up to the therapist's turn in line 15 onwards. At the start of the extract we see her begin announcing (presumably as part of some pro-forma script at the start of a session with a new client) that C may see her notes 'at any point'. She delivers this announcement going over and not ratifying C's minimal receipts as sufficient second pair parts to her invitation (if that is what it is). For C this may be a puzzle: his early understandings of the announcement
have not been enough and the therapist still seems to hold him accountable for a reply.
C's response in line 12 is designed to solve the apparent. pro~lem with his previous receipts. This time, he deSigns It as a request that perhaps shows his understanding of what appears to be some kind of preoffer by T: '(I'd like to) see me own record l really, f'wha ' they say [Oabou' meO ( )]'. The client's acti?n at. ~s point, then, can be heard as confinning the m-pnnclple nature that he may ask to see his own records. Not now, but sometime . The therapist could have taken this as fully meeting the case: she would be willing to make her notes availabJe, and he (eventua11y) requests that he would like to see them. She could have received his reply as confirming that he has understood her. But she recognizes it as an announcement rather than a. request; she receives C's turn in overlap with the newsmark 'Toh:::' and with a 'same evaluation agreement' (Pomerantz 1984a) , 's::::::o would TI::', the sound stretching causing it to be delivered in an exaggerated fashion. Indeed, an upgraded one: she'd 'love to know' . What does this achieve?
It apparently puts the therapist 'on the same side' as the client. Let us work up to the therapist's turn in Line 15 onwards. At the start of the ex.tract we see her begin announcing (presumably as part of some pro-fauna script at the start of a session with a new client) that C may see her notes 'at any point'. She delivers this announcement going over and not ratifying C's min.imal receipts as sufficient second pair parts to her invi- The client's action at this point, then, can be heard as connnning the in-principle nature that he may ask to see his own records . Not now, but sometime . The therapist could have taken this as fully meeting the case: she would be willing to make her notes available, and he (eventually) requests that he would like to see them. She could have received his reply as confirming that he has understood her. But she recognizes it as an announcement rather than a request; she receives C's turn in overlap with the newsmark 'Toh:::' and with the institutionally relevant mental-health records that she herself writes. The client displays a reading of the problem with records that con:finns this move: all the jargon they use and that. This promotes a reading of the problem with the records as (merely) their jargon; that is, their opaque language, not something more conventionally troubling like the severity of the illness they report, or the intimacy of the details they record. In sum, we can see the therapist successfully reanchoring the client's prior turn, and the client offering a collaborative uptake. Her disclosure offers them both a routine, everyday appreciation of what it would mean to 'see records', deleting any ambiguity there might be as to what sort of understanding the client might have about it. 4 One might argue that this is an example of a 'retro-sequence' launched from the second position, invoking a 'source/outcome' relationship (Schegloff 1995).
Matching with analogical 'second stories'
In the same second-position environment, the therapist could go beyond a comparatively simple agreement of the kind we saw above, to offer a 'second story' (Sacks 1992: vol. 2, 222-268) . That is, a narrative closely matching or treating as its source one aspect of the material in the client's immediately preceding turns. s Unlike the agreements we saw above, these disclosures recount some kind of complex episode, rather than merely relate an evaluation. In all the examples of second story in our sample, it was notable that the therapist went to some lengths to produce the story as an analogy. These analogies are narrative stories, certainJy; the difference is that here, as is common with the use of analogies, there are very strong directions to the client to learn, from what the therapist is saying, how better to understand their own experiences.
The analogies tended to be narrated over a number of turns, so the extracts will be rather long. Here is the beginning of one such disclosure-as-analogy: The material in lines 6-9 (that sounds quite reasonable to me . .. ) is important, and we will come back to it later. Now, though,' we want to concentrate on the self-disclosure (indicated by the arrows). A gloss will help. C has been complaining about disliking looking her father in the eye, and has suggested (in preceding talk not shown) that this is because she was made to do so when she was a child. The therapist assesses this as 'quite reasonable' and formulates the issue liS being a matter of being made to do something. The therapist then applies the situation to herself (if people made me do anything against my will ... ) aDd discloses something analogous about herself-y 'know, 1 like chocolate. She invites the client to consider how she (the therapist) would feel if she was nevertheless forced to eat chocolate.
We do oot reproduce the whole sequence, but the therapist then goes on to invite the client to consider the consequence of the therapist being forced to eat something she did not like. She would end up hating that item even more. The therapist brings the analogy to a conclusion thus: 4 One might argue that this is an example of a 'relro-sequence' launched from the second position, invoking a 'source/outcome' relationship (Schegloff 1995).
In the same second-position environment, the therapist could go beyond a comparatively simple agreement of the kind we saw above, to offer a 'second story' (Sacks 1992: vo1. 2, 222-268) . That is, a oarrative closeJy matching or treating as its source one aspect of the material in the client's immediately preceding turns . s Unlike the agreements we saw above, these disclosures rewunt some kind of complex episode, rather tban merely relate an evaluation. In all the examples of second story in our sample, it was notable that the therapist went to some lengths to produce the story as an analogy . These analogies are narrative stories, certainly; the difference is that here, as is common with the use of analogies, there are very strong directions to the client to learn, from what the therapist is saying, how better to understand their own experiences.
The analogies tended to be narrated over a number of turns, so the extracts will be rather long. Here is the beginning of one such disclosure-as-analogy: The material in lines 6-9 (that sounds quite reasonable to me ... ) is important, and we will come back to it later. Now, tbough,-we want to concentrate on the self-disclosure (indicated by the arrows). A gloss wiJl help. C has been complaining about disliking look.ing her father in the eye, and has suggested (in preceding talk not shown) that this is because she was made to do so when she was a child. The therapist assesses this as 'quite reasonable' and formulates the issue as being a matter of being made to do something. The therapist tben applies the situation to herself (if people made me do anything against my will ... ) and discloses something analogous about herself-y·know. 1 like chocolate . Sbe invites the client to consider how she (the therapist) would feel if she was nevertheless forced to eat chocolate.
We do not reproduce the whole sequence, but the tberapist then goes on to invite the client to consider the consequence of the therapist being forced to eat something she did not like. Sbe would end up hating that item even more. The therapist brings the analogy to a conclusion thus: The disclosure, then, introduces an analogy that picks out one aspect of the client's story-that she was made to do something she didn't like--and validates it by appeal to a generaJ principle exemplified, albeit hypothetically, in a projection of what the therapist might experience. The point of the analogy must be to offer to the client a way of understanding the fact that she hates looking her father in the eye . It is, according to this analogy, just like the therapist ending up hating chocolate or some other food item.
At this point we want to return to the material in lines 6-9. Notice that the therapist, just before she delivered her disclosure, offered the following evaluation of the client's story: (9) (Part of Extract [7] We can see another preface in this next example of a disclosure analogy. In th.is case, the disclosure is again arrowed, but notice the prefatory material in lines \4-17. voL 2) noted that in telling second stories the narrator usually matches the story, and adopts the same character position as the 1st storyteller. He, however, also noted that sometimes in 2nd stories, narrators systematically vary the character position from wlllch they speak (e.g., in accident stories the I se narrator could be a bystander At this point we want to return to the material in lines 6-9. Notice that the therapist, just before she delivered her disclosure, offered the following evaluation of the client's story: (9) Sacks (1992: vol. 2) noted that in telling second stories the narrator usually matches the story, and adopts the same chMacter position as the 1st storyteller. He, however, also no led that sometimes in 2nd stories, narrators systematically vary the character position from wlllcb they speak (e.g., in accident stories the 1st narrator could be a bystander but the 2nd-story narrator a victim). In the first format, the 2nd narrator matches and validates the 1st teller's experience; in the second format, however, the effect is more intricate-experiences of the 1st narrator can be complemented, developed, or even contrasted. This, it seems to us, is precisely what the therapist does in Extract (J 0). She presents what she says as matching the client's story, but then varies her narrative position and re-signifies the delayed gratification as not only the safe option but something that can be enjoyed.
The therapist's analogy is a way of dealing 'therapeutically' with the client's story. The client has expressed a self-awareness that he can be impatient in wanting to do something immediately before aU the preparation is made; rather than otTering advice that may be rejected, the therapist discloses that she herself is 'putting up with' preliminaries (studying and reading, building up her knowledge) before entering 'the world I want to go into' (lines 41 and 42). This disclosure picks out of the client's story the positive benefit of preparation: it emphasizes that (as the therapist herself is witness) it is a process that has to be 'put up with'. Indeed, it exemplifies the therapeutic axiom with which the therapist introduced the disclosure (lines 26-29): you may not be getting everything you want but you (are) laying the foundations. The therapist's observation here bears a family resemblance to what we saw the therapist doing in Extract (7). There the therapist claimed a general rule that one could end up hating something (as she herself might) if one were made to do it; here the therapist is claiming a general rule that one might have to (as she has had to) suffer a period of laborious preparation before enjoying the fruits of a project. Both generalizations serve to assuage, and normalize, the client's trouble. The tacit logic of normalization is that we all have such problems, they do not require psychotherapy, coping with them is a part of life. It is relevant that even though the therapist declares having a problem, it is not a problem which would position her as a potential psychotherapy client. Disclosure then normalizes the problem and in such a way that the therapeutic setting is maintained . Both presuppose that what the therdpist reveals is mundane.
A varian ( case.
The in terest of the next case is in the dissociation between the therapeutic analogy and the therapist's self-disclosure that personalizes it. This shows that the two activities can be separated; to deliver an analogy, a therapist need not actually infuse it with her or his own experience. But, should the analogy seem not to engender an appropriate uptake, a self-disclosure can be a way of upgrading it to the point where it gets a receipt from the client.
Just before the extract starts, the client has been talking about the fact that he has been trying to relax more: something he finds difficult. He is fighting against it all the time (in material not shown The client is prepared to acknowledge that he CHn ' relate to ilia::!', but whatever 'that' is, he qualifies his acceptance of it with the formuJa inasmuch as. That is a very circumscribed acknowledgement of the pertinence of the therapist's disclosure, and retrospectively confirms that offer of a disclosure could have been occasioned by her reacting of his previous receipts as 'reluctant>. The point we want to draw out from this example, is., as we said, that the analogy and the d.isclosure can be separated; but in pursuit of a response, the disclosure works to make the analogy more relevant to the client, and more effective as a means of normalization.
Self-disclosures as providing candidate answers
We came across cases where the therapist offered a disclosure where there was an accountable absence of something. The previous talk had shown that the client had been deficient in providing an answer to a question, or in coming up with some other expected second-pair part. In such a case, the therapists' disclosure could be said to act as a solution to an inferred 
4) ( ( T continues with disclosure))
The client has given two reasons for why people might smile at her by the time we get to line 19, where the therapist asks what else. At that point there is a pause, the client offers em:, and there is a further pause of 2.4 seconds. Clearly what is wanted is another reason; equally clearly, the client is having trouble finding one. The therapist at this point ctiscloses that she sometimes smiles at people even when she doesn't inunediately recognize them . 9 This is a candidate answer that orients to a hearable absence ( University etc.
The strong implication is that this disclosure, just here, is occasioned by the client's hearably dispreferred and 'unenthusiastic' (if we may gloss it as sucb) or 'noncommittal' receipt of the analogy the therapist had gone to some trouble to establish as a basis for interpreting his situation. Our case for reading it this way is confirmed in some degree if we play through the next few lines, where we see the client, again after a long pause, explicitly orients to the disclosure in a distinctly down-graded way:
(12) (follows on immediately from Extract (11)) 48 (1.5) 49 C: (w' I c'n) relate to tha::t >inas 50 muchas ah< need my wcekTends 51 now
The client is prepared to acknowledge that he CHn 'relate to th.a.:: t', but whatever 'that' is, he qualifies his acceptance of it with the formuJa inasmuch as. That is a very circumscribed acknowledgement of the pertinence of the therapist's disclosure, and retrospectively confums that offer of a disclosure could have been occasioned by her reading of his previous receipts as 'reluctant'. The point we want la draw out from trus example, is, as we said, that the analogy and the disclosure can be separated; but in pursuit of a response , the disclosure works to make the analogy more relevant to the client, and more effective as a means of normalization.
. Self-disclosures as providing candidiJle answers
We came across cases where the therapist offered a disclosure where there was an accountable absence of something. The previous talk had shown that the client had been deficient in providing an answer to a question, or in coming up with some other expected second-pair part. In such a case, the therapists' disclosure could be said to act as a solution to an inferred We join at the point where the therapist is making a suggestion in the fonn of a yes/no question: have you ever had a desire CO J don't know what people do, cook, or er paint. The client's answers (no cookin', no paint) are institutionally unhelpful in the sense that they allow nothing to be entered in the record; in that sense, they are deficient. In tine 8 there is a pause of 0.6 of a second after the client's second negative response, then the therapist launches her own disclosure: she's always had a desire to cook. The placement after an unsatisfactory response casts it as a way to answer the question. Although C provides no sub~ stantial take-up of even this candidate answer, the therapist nevertheless moves into closing this bit of business and starting the next (brilliant well let's have a look at what we've done today . . . ).
. Features common to the disclosures in our sample
We have now seen three different sequential environments where therapists' disclosures are employedwhat is spoken of as one phenomenon in the therapeutic literature: straightforward 'me too' agreements; more complex second stories elaborated as analogies; and candidate answers. We have said something about how each of these has different interactional consequences, for example they may offer a way of understanding what the client has just said (or gujdance for what the client should have said). Let us now consider two internal design featw-es recurring in the disclosures. One recurrent feature is the visible effort at designing the disclosure as pertinent to this recipient. The other, pointing in a rather contradictory direction, is the therapists' frequent use of hyperbole.
ReCipient design.
We observed two notable ways in which therapists took care to display that their disclosure was designed for this recipient, at this time, in this (sequential and therapeutic) environment. One was explicitly to call attention to the similarity or applicability of tbe disclosed experience to the client's circumstances (of course, the sequential placement of a second story will itself deliver a good deal of the implied relevance of trus story to the first one; but the therapist could, and did, do more besides). The other was to recount the disclosure as a current experience, preserving the temporality of the client's own current problem or trouble. We describe these in turn. We join at the point wbere the therapist is making a suggestion in the fonn of a yes/no question: have you ever had a desire to J don 't know what people do, cook, or er painl. The client's answers (no cookin', no pail/t) are institutionally uohelpfuJ in the sense that they allow nothing to be entered in the record; in that sense, they are deficient. In line 8 there is a pause of 0.6 of a second after the client's second negative response, then the therapist launches her own disclosure: she's always had a desire to cook. The placement after an unsatisfactory response casts it as a way to answer the question. Although C provides no substantial take-up of even this candidate answer, the therapist nevertheless moves into closing this bit of business and starting the next (brilIianl well let's have a look at what we've dOlle today . .. ).
Features common lO the disclosures in our sample
We have now seen three different sequential environ- 3.5.1. ReCipient design. We observed two notable ways in which therapists took care to display that their disclosure was designed for this recipient, at this time, in this (sequential and therapeutic) environment. One was explicitly to call attention to the simllanty or applicability of tbe disclosed experience to the client's circumstances (of course, the sequential placement of a second story will itself deliver a good deal of tbe implied relevance of trus story to the first one; but the therapist could, and did, do more besides). The other was to recount the disclosure as a current experience, preserving the temporality of the client's own current problem or trouble. We describe these in turn.
a. Calling auention 10 the applicability to Ihe client. In lines 3-5 the therapist offers her assessment of C's situation and embarks at line 9 on what may have turned into advice (perhaps in the fonnat of adviceas-infonnation, described by Silvennan 1997). This is however abandoned, and the restart is a disclosure of the therapist's own feelings of ineffectiveness: '>n-lah have< (off) days w'c1li :ents [an I (.) >feel'uvn< done very much'. The feature we would draw attention to (as indeed does the therapist herself, who announces 'the thing is .. .') is the reciprocity between the therapist's and her client's situation: 'Tmost of the time >(I'm doio very Twel1)=most of the time TYou do very well .' Pre-and post-framing the replacement of 'I'm doing' with 'you do' adds strongly to the message that the experiences and the circumstances are comparable (possibly recalling proverbs and other idioms, and perhaps even Thomas Harris's [1973] weU-known therapy-culture phrase 'I'm okay, you're okay'). This use of pre-framing plus replacement is also visible in the following example. We have already commented that the ordinariness of therapist self-disclosures fuoction to normalize clients' problems that the disclosures matches while maintaining therapeutic situation, in which the client is the locus of therapeutic problems and the psychotherapist is the problem solver. The present-tense format aids the nonnalization-it is a part of living ordinary life. What is interesting is that when the therapist does not currently share a s.imilar experience, what she or he can disclose is a hypothetical disposi tion to experience something li ke (or exactly like) the client's experience. We saw this in Extract (16) Pomerantz observes that such extreme language is often offered in an environment where the description is at odds with some other state of affairs, and serves to justify the speaker's belief that the matter being described is significant and newsworthy. This may be less relevant here than a rather different aspect of ECFs identified by : that they are designed to be understood as nonliteral, expressing not the facts of the matter, but rather the speaker's ]n lines 3-5 the therapist offers her assessment of Cs situation and emba(ks at line 9 on what may have turned into advice (perhaps in the fonnat of adviceas-information, described by Silvennan 1997) . This is however abandoned, and the restart is a disclosure of the therapist's own feelings of ineffectiveness: '>n-lah have< (off) days w'clTi:ents [an I (.) >feel'uvo< dooe very much'. The feature we would draw attention to (as indeed does the therapist herself, who announces 'the thing is .. .') is the reciprocity between the therapist's and her client's situation: 'Tmost of the time >(I'ffi doin very Twell)=most of the time TYou do very well.' Pre-and post-framing the replacement of 'I'm doing' with 'you do' adds strongly to the message that the experiences and the circumstances are comparable (possibly recalling proverbs and other idioms, and perhaps evcn Thomas Hams's [1973] weU-known therapy-culture phrase 'I'm okay, you're okay'). This use of pre-framing plus replacement is also visible in the following example. We note without going into details that in this case, perhaps at the limit of what might count as selfdisclosure, the therapist is matching her disclosure to a state of atfairs that she herself fonnulates. It is she who says that the client sounds like he's pretty unhappy, not sleeping very wef!. What we want to use this extract for is merely to see that the therapist (in pre-framing one bad tempered grumpier person with onc bad tempered gnonpy woman) works to project an equivalence between her (admittedly hypothetical) situation and that of the client. We have already commented tbat the ordinariness of therapist self-disclosures function to normalize clients' problems that the disclosures matches while maintaining therapeutic situation, in which the client is the locus of therapeutic problems and the psychotherapist is the problem solver. The present-tense format aids the normalization-it is a part of living ordinary life. What is interesting is tbat when the tberapist does not currently share a similar experience, what she or he can disclose is a hypothetical disposition to experience something like (or exactly like) the client's experience. We saw this in Extract (16) , where the therapist went through a set of circumstances and discloses that 'if you put Tme in that sit(uationl C( ... )) you'd see one bad tempered grumpy womTan'.
Extreme caseformuJalions.
A common., but not universal, feature of our cases of self-disclosure is hyperbole, or the use of what Pomerantz (1986) calls extreme case formulations (ECFs) . Examples in our sample include phrases such as 'I'm an absolute chocolate fan', 'I'm the worst cook in the world'.
Pomerantz observes that such extreme language is often offered in an environment where the description is at odds with some other state of affairs, and serves to justify the speaker's belief that the matter being described is significant and newsworthy. This may be less relevant here than a rather different aspect of ECFs identified by : that they are designed to be understood as nonJiteral, expressing not the facts of the matter, but rather the speaker's The disclosure is markedly hyperbolic: the therapist doesn't 'Tlike [to watch anything like that', 'can't bear it when they're kissin and s:loppin', she 'has to' swi tch off the set, and it is ' awful' . Note the hea rable nonliteralness of the disclosure . It is of course impossible for the therapist 'literally' not to be able to watch something (unless by physicaJ impossibility, such as being unable to receive these images on her television set, but that is not the force of the claim) .
It must be, as Edwards (2000) remarks, that the extremity of the language is meant to communicate her attitude to such things. What comes across is the therapist's feeling that such images are embarrassing, in poor taste, 'cringe-making', and so on. Thcse are all the feelings of an ordinary person, we should note, and not stereotypically those of a professional psychologist who can presumably take a cool look at even the most shocking material. Hence tbe disclosure works to affiliate with the client's own ' ordinaryperson' reaction to television, and, thereby, normalize an otherwise potentially odd-sounding response. It could be of course that the use of extreme case formulations is a part of particular therapists' idiom-this has to be established in future studies.
Discussion
By looking at therapists' self-disclosures we wanted to add to a growing conversation analysis account of the worklng practices of psychotherapy-a tradition started by Harvey Sacks's inclusion, in his 1960s lectures, of analyses of recordings of group therapy of a set of American teenagers (indeed whether they were in therapy or 'in an automobile discussion ' [1992: vol. I, 144} is one of the points of departure for Sacks's analysis). Largely dormant since then, the tradition has been revitalized in the last decade by some intensive work on counseling (e.g., PerakyHi. 1995; Silverman 1997) therapy as a form of interaction-institutional, to be sure, but nevertheless subject to the requirement that it be brought off in sequences of talk-CA is able to stand aside from the members' concerns in therapy (whether lay or professional) and throw its light on what they actually do.
Conversation analysis takes it that talk in interaction accomplishes actions. With respect to studying psychotherapy, the perennial problem of choosing terms to describe these activities is particularly acute. As Peruyla and Vehvilainen (2003) observe, therapy has an articulate set of terms Cor its own activities. How then to describe the actions of psychotherapists and their clients, and bow to marry up their own members' descriptions with tho~ of CA? Do therapists accomplish actions descnbed 'publicly' (as questioning, answering, repairing, etc.) or in their own terms-as for instance 'countering transference', 'reflecting back', and so on? There is a debate to be had about whether actions that are specific to a therapeutic institution can be reduced to everyday communicative actions, so that, for instance, all therapeutic 'interpretations' would be realized in a particular conversational fonnat. If one follows Elisabeth Aoscombe (1959), one might say that such actions are conversational actions that are, however understood in a different and inevitably progressively wider context (usually brought into the analysis through ethnography.) On that basis, to understand something as an interpretation or a disclosure, a conversational act has to be augmented by particulars made relevant by participants and seen as relevant by them. One of our sigillficant findings is that while psychotherapists' self-disclosures share certain features in common (they match experiences avowed by clients, are rather ordinary but pertinent to the client, and are possibly hyperbolic), they are done using a variety of distinct conversational fonnats. This means that disclosure is not a cohesive conversational practice, and conversational properties of 'disclosures' are necessary but not sufficient to define them as disclosures. What then keeps them together in one category? Possibly just the fact that the therapist reveals sometrung, however ordinary, about herself, vL~jbly in the service of therapy. How, and with what consequences, was the subject of this paper.
38 lvan Leudar, Charles Antaki, and We started from our preliminary observation that therapists' disclosures have an immediate resemblance to the kind of institutionally located disclosure found by Heritage and Lindstrom (1998) as part of their research on Health Visitors' interactions with mothers. As Heritage and Lindstrom found in the case of one of their health visitors, we found that our therapists designed their disclosures to match some element of the client's current talk. (We may say in parentheses that we did find some examples of therapist disclosures that made no such match, but, significantly, these occurred in the preamble to the therapeutic interaction itself, and we will not talk about them here.)
What does such matching do? Here we are comfortable only with explicating the formaB that we found, and detailing their institutional interactional functions . Certainly disclosing in agreement and analogy suggests that the therapist is offering the clients a way of understanding their own experiences. We can go one step further and note that the disclosures normalized, or in some other way ameliorared, the client's expressed problematic experiences. Hating looking one's father in the eye became a normal out· come of being made to hate anything, even (as in the therapist's case), chocolate; wanting to look at one's records became (as it was for the therapist) wanting to look at any doctor's records; things going badly at work were (as they were for the therapist) a matter of having off-days; and so on.
But there are many ways of being concrete without making a personal disclosure. Indeed, we saw one example (Extract [11] ) where the analogy (both fields and people needing fallow periods) was separate from the disclosure, and the analogy by itself received a markedly cool uptake by the client That the therapist immediately went on to disclose how that analogy applied to her own case suggests strongly that the disclosure adds some kind of accelerant to what the therapist is doing. The accelerating ingredient must presumably be the appeal to personal, 'every-day' evidence, as opposed to more abstract and tberapyspecific kinds of reasolling.
But we recognize that here we must hand back the turn to therapists for comment. It would be the work of a separate project to link the sorts of design and sequential placement features that were the theme of this analysis with the expressed, normative, institutional concerns of the therapeutic community. Conversation analysis is beginning to make its contribution to members' understandings of their institutional practices (for example, in medical consultations), and the work reported here might fruitfully be extended in that direction. For the moment, however, we sha11 have achieved our local purposes if, without going too far into speculation about their institutional objectives as they would be seen by members of the institution themselves, we have shed some light on therapists' self-disclosure as interactional phenomena. 'Reciprocation' is a common description of selfdisclosw-e in the psychological literatw-e, but we avoid it precisely because of its causal implications.
What the therapist's turn does, might depend on how one bears a mumbled section of line 14 in the extract. What we have put as a blank between round brackets might be something like 'a dunno if that's possible to'.
If it is, then it adds a sense that the client is making a positive bid actually to see these records. If the therapist hears it that way, then t.ransforming what 'records' means also eliminates tile motivation for his request. Even though, as Sacks put it at the time, 'it is absolutely nol the business of a psychiatrist, having had some experience reponed to him, to say "my mother was just like that too '" (1992. vol. I, 259) , Nevertheless, Peyrot (1987) has already noted how self-disclosure in psychotherapy relies on element> of conversational organization, such as second stories, to display understanding of the prior.
We started from our preliminary observation that therapists' disclosures have an immediate resemblance to the kind of institutionally located disclosure found by Heritage and Lindstrom (1998) as part of their research on Health Visitors' interactions with mothers. As Heritage and Lindstrom found in the case of one of their health visitors, we found (hat our therapists designed their disclosures to match some element of the client's current talk. (We may say in parentheses that we did find some examples of therapist disclosures that made 00 such match, but, significantly, these occurred in the preamble to the therapeutic interaction itself. and we will not talk about them here.)
What does such matching do? Here we are comfortable only with explicating the format~ that we found, and detailing their institutional ioteractional functions . Certainly disclosing in agreement and analogy suggests that the therapist is offering the clients a way of understanding their own experiences. We can go one step further and note that the disclosures nonna\ized, or in some other way ameliorated, the client's expressed problematic experiences. Hating looking one's flither in the eye became a normal outcome of being made to hate anything, even (as in the therapist's case), chocolate; wanting to look at one's records became (as it was for the therapist) wanting to look at any doctor's records; things going badly at work were (as they were for the therapist) a matter of having o IT-<lays; and so on.
But there are many ways of being concrete without making a personlll disclosure. Indeed, we saw one example (Extract [11] ) where the analogy (both fields and people needing fallow periods) was separate from the disclosure, and the analogy by itself received a markedly cool uptake by the client. That the therapist immediately went on to disclose how that analogy applied to her own case suggests strongly that the disclosure adds some kind of accelerant lO what the therapist is doing. The accelerating ingredient must presumably be the appeal to personal, 'every-day' evidence, as opposed to more abstract and therapyspecific kinds of reasoning.
But we recognize that here we must hand back the turn to therapists for comment. 11 would be the work of a separate project to link the sorts of design and sequential placement features that were the theme of this analysis with the ex.pressed, normative, institutional concerns of the therapeutic community. Conversation analysis is beginning to make its contribution to members' understandings of their institutional practices (for example, in medical consultations), and the work reported here might fruitfully be extended in that direction. For the moment, however, we sball have achieved our local purposes if, without going too far into speculation about their institutional objectives as they would be seen by members of the institution themselves, we have shed some light on therapists' self-disclosure as interaccional phenomena. ..
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The research reported in this article was facilitated by ESRC grant munber RES-OOO-22-0330. We have just one example of a therapist being asked a question about her showering habits by the client, as part of a dialogue about the client'~ disinclination lO bathe. We do have examples of disclosure of more significant troubles, loo «(or ex.ample, detailed accounts oC a failed business), but not such that would require psychotherapy. 'Reciprocation' is a common description of selfdisclosure in the psychological literature, but we avoid it precisely because of its causal implicatjon~.
What the therapist's turn does, might depend on how ooe bea~ a mumbled section of line 14 in the extract. What we have put as a blank between round brackets might be something like 'a dunno if that's possible to'. If it is, then it adds a sense that the client is making a posit.i.ve bid actually to see these records. If the lberapist be-MS it that way. then traDsforming what 'records' means also eliminates U1e motivation for his request. Even though, as Sack3 put it at the time, 'it is absolutely not the business of a psychiatrist, having had some experience reported to him, to say "my mother was just like that too '" (1992. vol. I, 259) . Nevertheless, Peyrot (1987) has already noted how self-disclosure in psychotherapy relies on elements of conversational organization, such as second stories, to displa y Wlderstanding of the prior.
6.
That is not to say that the analogy, and the conclusion, must be accepted by the client. Consider again lines 54-59 and see how the interaction immediately continues.
We join tbe talk when the therapist is drawing a conclusion about learning to dislike a food item (that's Just on a food basis). She starts one formulation of wbat follows:
'which isn' t (Tiike --)', but abandons that to restart 'which isn't ihalf as bad as feeling anlcomfortablc about something'. Possibly the therapist has abandoned a more specific reference 10 the client's actual ttouble of bating looking her father in the eye. The client restates her origina.! complaint (not shown). This can be seen as putting aside, or 'sequentially deleting' (Schegloff 1987) , all of the therapist's efforts at offering a reformulating analogy: in that sense, at least, the client's actions at this point might be called 're&istance' (see Antaki et al. 2(04) . 7.
'have to have' 8.
' C02 if 1 have', but mangled 9.
We notice, but do not analyze, that she prefaces her disclosure by a partly strangled, disfluent and mitigated introduction: >.h== ·akh-I-«·strangled*)) DON'T KNOW ABOUT< you:)
10. As well as the laughter particles in !he words, !here is 'suppressed laughter' at various times in this turn, but it isn't easy to specify its boundaries. I 1.
The overlap brackets in lines 7-15 above are approximate; the feel of the talk is that both speakers keep on with no gaps, throughout.
